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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM BAILEY STUMP, ) 
) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
BONETA LOU STUMP, ) 
) 
Defendant and Respondent.) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~~) 
Case No. 18036 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for divorce in which there were contested 
issues involving the division of marital assets and alimony. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After hearing the evidence offered by the respective par-
ties, the Trial Court made a division of the assets and fixed 
the amount of alimony to be awarded the defendant-wife. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent believes that the Decree of the Trial Court was 
fair and equitable, and seeks to have the Decree affirmed on 
appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant were married to each other on 
September 1, 1946, a period of some 35 years (R-66,82). They 
are the parents of four children, all of whom have reached 
their legal majority (R-67,82). They have two grandchildren 
(R-82,178). The husband is 59 years old (R-77) and the wife 
is 55 years old (R-85). 
The husband is employed in a top management position as 
controller for Utah Copper Division of Kennecott Minerals Com-
pany. He has been employed by Kennecott for 34 years, and has 
been controller for 10 years (R-67,68). He is the Chief Financial 
Officer of the Company and describes his job as a very responsible 
position (R-83). 
Mr. Stump's gross salary at the time of trial was $62,000.00 
per year or $5,166.67 per month (R-83,84). This figure does not 
include year end bonuses (R-84). Bonuses are determined at the 
end of the year and usually paid in February of the next year (R-85). 
In 1981, Mr. Stump received a $10,000.00 bonus for the year 1980; 
in 1980, he received a $6,000.00 bonus for 1979 (R-86). He testi-
fied that it was "very doubtful" that he would receive a bonus 
for 1981 (R-81); however, this self serving statement is incon-
sistent with his past history, at least for the prior two years. 
In his 34 years at Kennecott, he has never experienced any 
salary decrease. Any change in salary has been an upward change 
- 2 -
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(R-85). 
In addition to his salary and bonuses, Mr. Stump receives 
many fringe benefits from his employment. These include a 
liberal expense account that covers such things as club dues, 
business travel, entertainment of out of town guests and local 
travel in his own vehicle (R-87,163). In connection with the 
expense account, the Company advances $1,000.00 per month, 
which he must then account for in expenses (R-165). Additional 
fringe benefits also include Company contributions to a savings 
plan (R-115), health care and disability protection programs 
(R-122), retirement benefits (R-121), and insurance benefits 
(R-122). 
The defendant-wife has made her career at home. She has 
not had outside employment during the period of the marriage 
and in fact her husband has insisted that she not go to work 
(R-79). Her plans over the course of the marriage have never 
included a future employment (R-88). She was unemployed at the 
time of the trial (R-179). She has no source of income except 
from her husband (R-180). Upon divorce, she will be deprived 
of her husband's fringe benefits (R-123). Her work experience 
is limited to a job in a savings and loan company which she 
held 35 years ago (R-89), and non-paying civic jobs which she 
held in a small Arizona town (R-87). She has had no job 
training (R-179). She has had no college or university training 
except for a few recent non-vocational classes taken at the 
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University of Utah (R-179). Her inquiries into employment 
opportunities have not met with any success (R-180). She is 
physically in good health (R-79), but had a mental breakdown 
resulting from the divorce and was hospitalized for 3~ weeks 
during part of the time that these proceedings were pending 
(R~l90). When she moved to Utah in 1980, she had no knowledge 
that her husband intended to file for a divorce (R-183). She 
has since moved to Alameda, California in order to live near 
her family and relatives (R-178). She has no immediate plans 
to work (R-179), but desires to enroll and receive some kind 
of training at Alameda Community College (R-180). Her long 
range work plans are simply uncertain (R-180). 
Plaintiff-husband acknowledges that over the period of 
the marriage, defendant has been a good mother, kept a neat, 
clean home, and has never been unfaithful to him (R-129). The 
only specific grounds for divorce are that ten years ago she 
complained that "the kids were not doing their fair share"; 
that on occasion she would not go with him to the Elk's Club; 
that she drank wine; and that on occasions fell asleep watching 
TV instead of coming to bed with him (R-68,69,129). On the 
other hand, the plaintiff has been flagrantly unfaithful to 
the defendant and has been openly living with a one Ellen Jensen 
during the past year (R-109,129). The evidence also showed 
that plaintiff had been paying for a $500.00 per month apartment 
- 4 -
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for himself, Ellen Jensen and her parents (R-132,133); that he 
paid all of the utilities in addition to the rent (R-133); that 
he has taken Ellen Jensen on expensive trips (R-134); that he 
has bought her expensive presents (R-137,142,144); that he 
bought a freezer and made large meat purchases from Ellen's 
relatives to feed himself and her family (R-140); that he has 
paid her medical and hospital expenses (R-146); and that he 
has given her cash from time to time (R-145). 
The amount spent by the plaintiff on Ellen Jensen, or other-
wise unaccounted for, was in sharp dispute between the parties. 
What was not in dispute, however, was the fact that although 
the plaintiff had had a long history of high earnings, there 
was a relative small marital estate available for distribution. 
The trial court, after hearing all of the evidence, accepted 
defendant's version of the facts and made the following finding 
(R-46): 
"The Court is convinced that plaintiff has dissipa-
ted assets for his own purposes and has generally made 
no attempt to preserve the marital assets for distribu-
tion. He has had control of substantial funds which he 
has used at his discretion and has not sufficiently or 
convincingly accounted for said funds. These facts, to-
gether with the minimal liquid assets currently availa-
ble for distribution, and the huge disparity in the 
parties earning capacity (which will affect their 
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respective ability to build up an estate sufficient 
to provide support after retirement) require that most 
of the assets be distributed to the defendant, and 
that most of the debts separately incurred by plaintiff 
(for which he received the consideration) go to him". 
Based upon the above Finding, the Court proceeded to award 
defendant a majority of assets and made the following alloca-
tion: 
To the plaintiff 
(a) The cash in his checking account (approximately 
$295.64). 
(b) All of the Paradox stock (worth approximately 
$3,000.00). 
(c) His 1981 Pontiac automobile, subject to all in-
debtedness thereon. 
(d) The 1981 Kennecott Copper Corporation mortgage 
differential (having a value of approximately 
$316.80). 
(e) The State Farm homeowners rebate ($163.40). 
(f) The note receivable for the sale of his 1978 
Chevrolet automobile (2,700.00). 
(g) The Bel-Style furniture leased by him. 
(h) One-half of the approximately $14,207.00 pre-
sently vested in the Kennecott savings plan at 
the time it is distributed. 
- 6 -
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(i) All of the liabilities to the following named 
creditors: 
1. Girard Bank. 
2. First Interstate Bank of Arizona. 
3. Kennecott Copper - R.A.Y. Credit Union. 
4. Kennecott Copper - CitiBank. 
5. Gas credit card accounts. 
6. Sears. 
7. Ambassador Club. 
8. Utilities owing at Casino Way. 
9. Redman Van and Storage. 
10. Montgomery Ward. 
11. American Express. 
12. J. C. Penney. 
To the defendant 
(a) The Utah tax refund ($658.55). 
(b) The $20,997.81 cash in escrow from the sale of the 
parties' residence. 
(c) The 50 shares of ASARCO stock ($2,031.25). 
(d) 1977 Chrysler automobile. 
(e) Furniture and furnishings from home. 
(f) The paintings given to her in the course of the 
marriage. 
(g) One-half of the approximately $14,207.00 pre-
sently vested in plaintiff's Kennecott savings 
and investment plan at the time it is distribu-
ted. 
In addition to the above, the Court awarded defendant ali-
mony in the amount of $1,800.00 per month, one-half of the 
vested benefits under plaintiff's retirement plan, and some life 
- 7 -
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insurance benefits not in dispute (R-49). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS FAIR AND 
EQUITABLE 
It was the wife's position in this case that during the 
period of the separation of the parties, there was a large 
amount of cash under the control of the husband that was not 
accounted for. The trial court so found in its Finding No. 8 
(R-46). Thus, the award of property to the wife was not dis-
proportionate when an adjustment is made for the cash shortages. 
Evidence of the cash shortages was follows: 
According to the 1980 tax return, the parties had a 
gross income in 1980 of $79,318. 74. 1 They paid federal and 
state taxes of $20,787.11. In September of 1980, the husband 
started to pay to wife under an order for temporary support 
(R-21) the condominium fees and mortgage (which according 
to appellant's brief at page 3 was $840.00 per month), plus 
$400.00 per month in cash, making a total of $1240.00 per month. 
Prior to September, he provided her some support, but 
1 The tax return is included as a part of the evidence but 
apparently was not given an exhibit number. It was used and 
referred to throughout the trial without objection (See e.g. 
R-84). 
- 8 -
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acknowledged that he never paid her anything in excess of what 
was ordered under the temporary support order (R-104). Giving 
him the benefit of the doubt, and assuming that he paid his wife 
$1240.00 for the entire year, the total expenditures on her be-
half for 1980 would have been $14,880.00. 
The husband's living expenses for the same period accord-
2 ing to his own exhibit (Exhibit 1-P) was $18,192.00. Thus, 
for the year 1980, we summarize as follows: 
Income 
Less: 
Taxes 
Wife's living ex-
penses 
Husband's living 
expenses 
Unaccounted for in 1980 
$79,319.84 
$20,787.11 
14,880.00 
18,192.00 - 53,859.11 
$25,460.73 
For the year 1981 up to the date of trial (August 7, 1981), 
the figures were as follows: 
Salary (7 months) 
Bonus received 
$36,166.69 
10,000.00 
2 This figure takes at face value the amount plaintiff claims 
in his exhibit as living expenses, less the support paid to 
wife (accounted for in her figures), and the monthly payments 
to Girrard Bank and GMAC which were not incurred during 1980. 
- 9 -
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Sale of Kennecott Stock (R-100) 
Total Income for 7 months 
$ 3,658.00 
$49,824.63 
From the above, the following expenses 
should be deducted: 
Taxes (including $2,500.00 
on bonus) $11,313.00 
Wife's living expenses 8,680.00 
Husband's living expenses 10,612.00 30,605.00 
In substracting the expenses from the income for the first seven 
months of 1981, there is an additional $19,219.63 that is miss-
ing. 
The total amount unaccounted for during this 19 month period 
in 1980 and 1981 was $44,680.36. This is in addition to large 
amounts that the plaintiff claims to have borrowed during the 
same period and for which he likewise cannot sufficiently account. 
Typical of the plaintiff's explan~tion for the loss of funds 
was the following dialogue taken from page 105 of the record: 
"Q: What about the $10,000.00 dividend that you 
received in the spring of this year (1981)? 
What happened to that money? 
A: I just spent it. 
Q: Just blown? 
A. Just blown it." 
Only one of two conclusions can be made from the above facts. 
3 See discussion of debts beginning on page 13 supra. 
- 10 -
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Either the husband has spent large sums of money for his own 
purposes, or he still has it. Either way, it should not be 
to the prejudice of the wife. 
In light of the above, the wife urged the trial court 
to award her the first $40,000.00 of assets before making any 
further division. She sought in closing argument the en-
tire proceeds from the sale of the parties' equity in the 
condominium of $20,997.81, and the entire amount of the 
Kennecott Savings & Investment Plan of $14,209.00, which 
were the only two assets of any substantial value. The Court 
found that the husband had not sufficiently and convincingly 
accounted for the loss of funds, but nevertheless awarded 
defendant only one-half of the Kennecott Savings & Invest-
ment Plan. The bulk of the remaining assets were awarded 
to her. In addition to the problem of the missing funds, 
the Court cited the minimal liquid assets available for dis-
tribution and huge disparity in the parties' earning capacity 
as additional reasons for making an unequal division of 
the few remaining assets over which the Court had control. 
Throughout the trial, the defendant insisted that he had 
only spent $2,000.00 of the marital assets on his girl 
friend, Ellen Jensen (R-134). The Court was not obligated 
- 11 -
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to believe this testimony, 4 which was also in direct con-
flict with his own specific figures. 5 Further, it would be 
irrelevant whether the missing funds were spent on Ellen, 
or for any other purpose. 
Plaintiff further argues in his brief that he was 
awarded a negative property distribution of $13,117.10. This 
is totally absurd, and results from a manipulation and dis-
tortion of figures on the part of plaintiff for the purposes 
of the trial. The principal deceptive figure used by plain-
tiff in making his argument is the obligation figure of 
$38,271.88 which he claims the Court ordered him to 
4 It is the perogative of the trial judge to judge the credi-
bility of witnesses, and in case of conflict the Supreme Court 
should assume that the trial court believed the evidence which 
supports her findings. Stone v. Stone, 19 Utah 2d 378; 431 P. 
2d 802. 
5 Expenditures that were acknowledged were as follows: $500.00 
per month rent on an apartment for one year (R-132); utilities 
in apartment (R-132); pleasure trips to San Francisco and 
El Paso costing approximately $4,000.00 (R-136); purchase of 
ten speed bike for $115.49 (R-137); purchase of dress for $72.45 
(R-137); $650.00 for purchase of meat for Ellen, plaintiff and 
Ellen's parents (R-140); $140.00 for a lighter (R-142); cash 
spending money in amounts of $300.00, $300.00, $150.00 and 
$200.00 (R-145); $50.00 for a portrait (R-144); $650.00 for the 
purchase of a dress and robes (R-144); hospital and medical ex-
penses of which the amount was not shown (R-146). All of these 
expenses were in the year 1980. Defendant did not go into 
specific expenditures for the year 1981, as the plaintiff's 
check records for 1981 had not been available prior to trial 
(R-148,150). 
- 12 -
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6 
assume That figure includes numerous items of highly 
questionable validity. They are as follows: 
1. It includes $12,048.96 as being the balance due on 
a new 1981 Pontiac Grand Prix which the plaintiff purchased 
approximately one month before the trial (R-95). A large 
portion of the debt is nothing more than future precomputed 
interest which has been added to the purchase price (R-99). 
Certainly the wife should not be chargeable for this item. 
2. It includes $11,579.75 as the claimed balance owing 
to Girrard Bank. Plaintiff's financial statement of September 
1, 1980 7 showed a liability to Girrard Bank of only $450.00. 
Thus, during the time this action was pending (the complaint 
having been filed in June, 1980), the liability to Girrard 
Bank increased by $11,139.75. This amount is not accounted 
for by the plaintiff and is in addition to the $44,680.36 in 
other income not accounted for as explained on page 10 
supra. 
3. It includes $3,968.00 owing to Kennecott Copper Cor-
poration which likewise did not appear in the September 1, 
1980 financial statement. Although the plaintiff's explanation 
6 
7 
A breakdown of the $38,271.88 figure is shown on Exhibit 
2P. 
See Appendix to Appellant's Brief. 
- 13 -
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of this item is somewhat confusing, it appears to be merely 
a negative charge against plaintiff's expense account for which 
he has not yet submitted his expense vouchers (R-162). 
4. It includes $3,200.00 in attorney's fees owing by 
the husband for services in connection with this divorce (R-166). 
Since the wife has an equivalent attorney's fee (~-193) that is 
not shown in plaintiff's exhibit, her distribution would like-
wise be reduced by a proportionate amount. The husband was 
not ordered by the Court to pay wife's attorney's fees in this 
action (R-49). 
5. It includes $1,631.45 owing to First Interstate Bank. 
This represents a loss on the purchase and sale of Kennecott 
stock (R-160). This stock was purchased on margin in approxi-
mately September, 1980 without the knowledge or consent of 
wife (R-128). If plaintiff desires to speculate with the assets 
of the marriage during the period of time that a divorce is 
pending and when contested claims are being made against 
marital assets, it should be at his own risk. 
6. It includes an obligation to CitiBank of $1,409.27 
which is simply a credit card account that likewise was not in 
existence at the time of the September 1, 1980 financial state-
ment. Nor were the other credit card and department store 
accounts in existence at that time. It also includes Ambassador 
Club charges which would reasonably be chargeable to plaintiff's 
- 14 -
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expense account. 
In addition to the distorted obligation figure used by 
the plaintiff in making his argument, there are other disputed 
figures that, to a lesser degree, make the property division 
more equal than plaintiff would like it to appear. For example, 
the furniture awarded to wife is claimed by plaintiff to have 
a value of $7,500.00; however, the wife did not consider it 
to be worth that much (R-182) and the Court in its findings did 
not attempt to fix any value. Also, the Paradox stock awarded 
to the husband was valued by him at only $3,000.00, when in 
fact the actual investment in the stock (most of which was pur-
chased as late as March, 1981 without wife's knowledge or con-
sent) was $5,000.00 (R-151,153). Also included in the award 
to the wife were two paintings that the husband had given to her 
as birthday and anniversary presents (R-156). They were arbi-
trarily valued by husband at $4,000.00, yet they cost $2,650.00 
(R-78). 
An evaluation of all of the above compels the conclusion 
that the Court was fair and equitable in the making of the 
property distribution. If anything, the award favored the hus-
band, as defendant believes that she should have been awarded 
the entire Kennecott Savings & Investment Plan of $14,207.00 
rather than only one-half of it. 
§30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated provides that "when a decree 
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of divorce is made, the Court may make such orders in relation 
to the . . . property as may be equitable". The Utah Supreme 
Court has consistently held that the trial court has considerable 
latitude in making a division of property. It is stated in 
English v. English (Utah 1977), 565 P.2d 409, as follows: 
"The trial court, in a divorce action, has considera-
ble latitude of discretion in adjusting financial 
and property interests. A party appealing therefrom 
has the burden to prove there was a misunderstanding 
or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial 
and prejudicial error; or the evidence clearly pre-
ponderated against the findings; or such a serious in-
equity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion''. 
See also Berry v. Berry (Utah 1981), 635 P.2d 68, where the 
Court states: 
"There is no fixed formula which a trial judge must 
follow in making a division of properties. Cox v. 
Cox, Utah, 532 P.2d 994 (1975). It is the preroga-
tive of the court to make whatever disposition of 
property it deems fair, equitable and necessary for 
the protection and welfare of the parties. Hamilton 
v. Hamilton, Utah 562 P.2d 235 (1977). Its division 
will not be disturbed on appeal unless the record 
shows that there has been an abuse of discretion. 
Jesperson v. Jesperson, Utah 610 P.2d 326 (1980)." 
There is nothing in the record of the instant case which 
would even remotely show an abuse of discretion on the part 
of the trial court. Appellant claims that the trial judge 
took a punitive approach, yet there is not a single reference 
to any com.~ent made by the trial court, or anything done by 
her during the trial to support such a claim. The trial judge 
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did not consider the fault of either party in making the 
property division, but based it upon the plaintiff's failure 
to account for assets, the minimal assets available for dis-
tribution, and the huge disparity between the parties re-
spective earning capacity (R-39,46). These findings, as in 
any case, are entitled to the usual presumptions of credibility. 
Appellant has made a point in his brief to the effect 
that the property division should be in accordance with the 
"community property" laws of the State of Arizona. There was 
no Arizona property in this marriage. The condominium from 
which proceeds were derived was located in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Neither party claimed to be resident of Arizona and in fact 
plaintiff testified that he was a bona fide resident of Salt 
Lake County, Utah (R-66). And further, even if Arizona law 
were to apply, the Court would still have the power to order 
a division and disposition of the community property of the 
parties. Proffit v. Proffit, 105 Ariz. 222; 462 P.2d 391. 
In Arizona, the Court is not required to divide the community 
property equally, but equitably, and, in making apportionment, 
can consider excessive or abnormal expenditures as well as 
destruction, concealment or fraudulent disposition of community 
property. Kosidlo v. Kosidlo, 125 Ariz. 32; 607 P.2d 15. 
The division of property by the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
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POINT II 
THE AWARD OF ALIMONY BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS FAIR AND EQUITABLE 
Respondent has no quarrel with the cases cited in appellant's 
brief to the effect that alimony is not intended for the pur-
pose of inflicting punishment. Indeed, respondent agrees 
wholeheartedly with the appellant's leading case of English v. 
English (Utah 1977), 565 P.2d 409, wherein it is stated: 
" ... the most important function of alimony is to 
provide support for the wife as nearly as possible 
at the standard of living she enjoyed during the 
marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming 
a public charge .... (the) criteria considered in 
determining a reasonable award for support and main-
tenance include the financial conditions and needs 
of the wife, the ability of the wife to produce a 
sufficient income for herself; and the ability of 
the husband to provide support". 
In English, the Court reduced the alimony award because the evi-
dence clearly showed that with the wife's separate income, she 
only needed an additional $1500.00 per month for the support of 
the entire family. 
In applying the standard announced in English, the trial 
court in the instant case made the following findings (R-46): 
"6. Defendant has not been employed outside the home 
for approximately 35 years and has no degrees, skills, 
training or experience of any kind which would permit 
her to either earn substantial amounts or to build 
any kind of security comparable to plaintiff's before 
she reaches retirement age. 
7. Def7ndant needs $1800.00 per month in alimony 
to provide for her care and support, which amount 
is within the ability of plaintiff to pay". 
- 18 -
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Evidence in support of the above findings included the testi-
mony of the wife that in order to maintain something close 
to her standard of living she would need $1,922.00 per month 
(R-181; Exhibit 11-D). While it is true that some of her 
monthly needs were estimated (she never having previously 
had the experience of maintaining a separate household) there 
was never any serious claim that her estimates were out of line 
or not made in good faith. They were also approximately the 
same as the expense figures used by Mr. Stump in showing his 
own monthly needs (Exhibit 1-P). 
Appellant argues that the alimony is excessive and unfair. 
He urges that his "take home" pay, as shown by Exhibit 1-P, 
is only $2,679.44 per month, and that it is unreasonable to 
award defendant $1,800.00 of that amount. The problem with 
appellant's argument is that the figure he represents as being 
"take home" pay is again manipulated and distorted. To arrive 
at said figure, he has deducted the following amounts from 
his gross income: 
1. $1,569.83 in federal and state taxes. This is 
completely out of line as any alimony payments 
can now be deducted from gross income and will 
reduce his tax obligation considerably. 
2. $310.00 for contributions to a savings and in-
vestment plan. This is strictly voluntary. 
3. $343.00 in FICA, when in fact FICA only applies 
to the first $29,000.00 of income. 
4. $17.95 to United Fund voluntary contributions. 
- 19 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5. $180.00 in accounts payable to the Credit 
Union and to Kennecott, which amounts, if 
valid, are of a temporary nature. 
Inasmuch as the husband's "take home" figures are entirely 
without credibility, the Court should look to the undisputed 
gross figures. The husband's undisputed gross earnings per year, 
excluding bonuses, are $62,000.00. If he pays defendant 
$1,800.00 per month (or $21,600.00 per year), it still leaves 
him $40,400.00 to live on. This amount is almost double what 
defendant will receive. The $21,600.00 paid to the wife will 
be completely tax deductible by the husband, and each of the 
parties can then pay their own taxes on their respective amounts. 
Plaintiff, in addition to the $40,400.00, will still have his 
$1,000.00 per month expense account, out of which he gets some 
benefit, plus the entire amount of his bonuses should he receive 
them. 
When the above figures are looked upon objectively, it 
would appear that if anyone has been short changed, it is the 
wife, not the husband. The plaintiff's income is such that 
defendant should not have had her requested alimony cut from 
$1,922.00 to $1,800.00 per month. In any event, the Court's 
finding that $1,800.00 per month is within the ability of 
plaintiff to pay, is clearly supported by the evidence. 
Appellant recites at page 13 of his brief that the trial 
court found that the wife was capable of being employed and 
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earning $700.00 to $800.00 per month. This statement is abso-
lutely false. The husband argued to the trial court that a 
reasonable alimony figure would be $700.00 per month. In com-
menting upon this argument, the Court in its Memorandum Decision 
stated that even if defendant were to be able to earn an addi-
tional $700.00 to $800.00 per month, the suggested alimony figure 
of $700.00 would still be unconscionable under the circumstances 
(R-39). There is no finding anywhere of any ability on the part 
of the defendant to earn anything, and the alimony award is 
"based upon the present financial circumstances of the parties" 
(R-49). 
The award of alimony by the trial court should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE AWARD OF ONE-HALF OF VESTED BENEFITS UNDER THE RETIREMENT 
PLAN WAS FAIR AND EQUITABLE 
One of the assets of the marriage was a fully vested, but 
unmatured retirement plan at Kennecott Minerals (Exhibit 4-P; 
R-120-122). The vested rights. under this plan were such that 
if plaintiff never worked another day in his life he would be 
entitled to receive $1,757.008 per month beginning at retirement 
8 Exhibit 4-P showed the vested portion of the retirement plan 
to be $1,592.00 per month; however, the exhibit only computed 
the benefit as of June 1980. After 6 years (retirement age) the 
benefit would be $2,608.00 per month and the monthly benefit was 
thus increasing $170.16 per year. In computing the current vested 
monthly benefit, the trial court correctly added an additional 
year of vesting to the amount shown on Exhibit 4-P, since the 
trial took place in August, 1981. 
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age of 65; or if he continues to work until age 65, his retire-
ment benefits will increase to $2,608.00 per month. 
Inasmuch as the retirement benefits were earned as a part 
of plaintiff's employment compensation, and inasmuch as the 
entire vested portion had accumulated during the marriage, the 
Court awarded one-half of the vested benefits to the wife. She 
will get her portion only if and when the benefits are actually 
received. If the benefits never mature because of the husband's 
premature death, she gets nothing. She gets no part of any 
increase in benefits resulting from the husband's continued 
employment. No attempt was made to put a present value on the 
retirement benefits, as it was not considered in weighing the 
other property distribution; rather it was considered as a 
separate item of marital property and divided equally. 
The approach taken by the trial court has found support 
and approval in many recent cases from other jurisdictions. 
Perhaps the leading case is In Re Marriage of Brown (California 
1976), 544 P.2d 561. In a comprehensive opinion, the Court 
reasoned that non-vested retirements were property subject to 
division in dissolution proceedings; that such benefits are 
not gratuities flowing from the employer's beneficence, but 
rather part of the consideration earned by the employee, a 
form of deferred compensation for services rendered; that the 
employee's right to such benefits is a contractual right derived 
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from the employment contract; and the fact that such right is 
contingent upon future events does not degrade it into a mere 
expectancy. The Court further noted that in recent times pension 
benefits have become an increasingly significant part of the 
consideration earned by the employee and that in many instances 
may be the single most important asset of the marital community, 
and that a property division which excludes this important asset 
from consideration would be highly inequitable. In determining 
the way in which pension benefits should be divided, the Court 
then stated as follows: 
"In dividing nonvested pension rights as community 
property, the court must take account of the possi-
bility that death or termination of employment may 
destroy those rights before they mature. In some 
cases, the trial court may be able to evaluate this 
risk in determining the present value of those 
rights. (Authorities cited). 
But if the Court concludes that because of uncer-
tainties affecting the vesting or maturation of 
the pension that it should not attempt to divide 
the present value of pension rights, it can instead 
award each spouse an appropriate portion of each 
pension payment as it is paid. This method of dividing 
the community interest in the pension renders it un-
necessary for the Court to compute the present value 
of the pension rights, and divides equally the risk 
that the pension will fail to vest. (Authorities cited)." 
Another leading case taking the above approach is In Re Marriage 
of Hunt (Ill. 1979), 397 N.E.2d 511. In quoting in part from 
Brown, supra, the Illinois Court states as follows: 
"In those instances where it is difficult to place 
a present value on the pension or profit sharing 
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interests due to uncertainties regarding vest-
ing or maturation, or when the present value can 
be ascertained by the type, or lack, of other mari-
tal property makes it impractical or impossible 
to award sufficient offsetting marital property 
to the non-employee spouse, then the trial court in 
its discretion may award each spouse an appropriate 
percentage of the pension paid 'if, as and when' 
the pension becomes payable. (Authorities cited). 
The marital interest in each payment will be a 
fraction of that payment, the numerator of the 
fraction being the number of years (or months) of 
marriage during which benefits were being accumu-
lated, the denominator being the total number of 
years (or months) during which benefits were 
accumulated prior to when paid. The trial court, 
when using this method of allocation, will retain 
jurisdiction and award the non-employee spouse some 
percentage of the marital interest in each payment. 
(Authorities cited). 
Placing a present value on a non-vested pension or 
profit sharing interest requires a court to take into 
account the possibility that death or termination of 
employment may destroy the interest. Thus, this 
second method of allocating the interest seems par-
ticularly appropriate if the interest has not vested, 
because it 'divides the risk that the pension will 
fail to vest' ". 
Other courts adopting the "if, as and when" approach are Weir 
v. Weir (N.J. 1980), 413 A.2d 638; Cearley v. Cearley (Texas 
1976) 544 S.W.2d 661; Shill v. Shill (Idaho 1979) 599 P.2d 
1004. See also In Re Marriage of Tjernlund (Ore. 1976), 557 
P.2d 61, affirming award to wife of $100.00 per month from 
retirement funds of husband if he chooses to receive monthly 
benefits, or a lump sum of a stated amount should he choose 
a lump sum distribution of his retirement account. 
Appellant has urged that the disposition of the vested 
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retirement benefits is in direct conflict with the pronounce-
ment of this Court in Bennett v. Bennett (Utah 1980), 607 P.2d 
841. Bennett was a three to two decision involving one member 
of the present court on each side of the decision. It held 
that under the circumstances of that case, a government retire-
ment fund of the husband having no present value could not be 
considered as an asset of the marriage. 
Respondent isn't quite sure how far the holding in Bennett 
was meant to apply, or how it is to be reconciled with other 
Utah cases. 9 If it is construed narrowly to mean that the court 
should not attempt to place a value and use said value as a 
significant predicate in the division of other assets, then it 
can be easily distinguished. If on the other hand, it means that 
an unmatured vested plan cannot under any circumstances be con-
sidered as an asset of the marriage for distribution, then it is 
patently unfair, contrary to reality, inconsistent with the case 
law generally, and should be overruled. 
In the case at hand, the vested retirement benefit has been 
accumulating for some 35 years. During this period, the marriage 
has been operating as a partnership with each of the marriage 
9 Two cases prior to Bennett held that retirement plans were 
properly taken into consideration in the dividing of marital 
assets. Englert v. Englert (Utah 1978), 576 P.2d 1274; Ehninger 
v. Ehninger (Utah 1977), 579 P.2d 1104. In a post Bennett case, 
Fletcher v. Fletcher (Utah 1980), 615 P.2d 1218, the court con-
sidered retirement benefits, although the exact nature of the 
retirement plan was not explained in the opinion. 
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partners assuming different roles. The husband's role has 
been that of a bread winner on the job. The wife's role has 
been in the home. 10 Is the court now going to exercise its 
wisdom as to which of these respective contributions is the 
most valuable? And, unless the court does so, is there any 
rhyme or reason as to why the accumulated employment benefits 
should not belong equally to the two marriage partners? To 
simply say that the benefits have no present worth is a fiction 
of the greatest magnitude, and would work a great injustice upon 
the wife. It is true that the present worth may be difficult 
to determine, but there is no reason to even determine the 
exact value where the court makes an equal division as it did 
here. 
In the recent case of Robert C.S. v. Barbara J.S. (Del. 1981) 
434 A.2d 383, the court in a well reasoned decision noted that 
the trend in the law was to reject any distinction between pen-
sion benefits on the basis of vesting. See also Linson v. 
Linson (Hawaii 1980) 618 P.2d 748. In the instant case, the 
Court doesn't have to go that far, as the pension benefits 
awarded by the trial court were 100% vested. The division of 
the vested retirement benefits should be affirmed. 
lO It may be argued from common knowledge that this role 
may be much more difficult and time consuming where a family 
is involved. We have grown up with the expression: "A man 
works from sun to sun but a woman's work is never done". 
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POINT IV 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Because of the fact that the wife was awarded cash assets, 
the trial court concluded that she should pay her own attorney's 
fees (R-48). This finding, however, was only intended to 
apply to the trial in the District Court and does not extend to 
the appeal. Inasmuch as respondent has now been required to 
defend an unmeritorious appeal, she should be awarded attorney's 
fees for the appeal. 
In Fletcher v. Fletcher, (Utah 1980) 615 P.2d 1218, the 
Court held that in a divorce case, there are a number of factors 
to be considered in determining whether attorney's fees should 
be awarded on appeal, and that the issue of attorney's fees 
should be remanded to the trial court for determination as to 
whether an award should be made, and if so, the amount thereof. 
There is no necessity to file a cross appeal in order to 
be awarded attorney's fees on appeal. Coates v. American Economy 
Insurance·company (Utah 1981), 627 P.2d 92. 
The matter of attorney's fees should be remanded to the 
trial court for determination. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no evidence whatsoever that the trial court made 
any punitive considerations whatsoever in the fashioning of the 
decree. The decree was fair and equitable, and if anything, 
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favored the husband. 
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed and 
the matter remanded solely for the purpose of fixing the 
attorney's fee to be awarded respondent on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
- 28 -
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William Bailey Stump, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Bo11eta Lou Stump, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
********** 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
RWB 
Nov # l 
Bench Memorandum 
No. 18036 
Following entry of a divorce decree, husband chal-
lenges the property distribution of the marital estate and the 
award of alimony. 
ISSUES: 
1. Was the division of property equitable? 
2. Given the needs of the wife and the earning of 
the husband, was the alimony award equitable? (Husband seeks 
to reduce the $1800/month award to $900/month.) 
3. Did the court properly consider and divide hus-
band's retirement benefits? 
4. Is wife entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
The parties were married in Phoenix, Arizona in 1946. 
The parties had four children, all of whom have reached majority. 
Husband has worked for Kennecott since shortly after the marriage 
and for the past 10 years has been controller of the company. 
In February, 1980, husband was transferred from Arizona to Utah. 
Wife remained in Arizona until June, 1980, at which time the 
family home was sold. The proceeds of that sale were used to 
purchase a condominium in Utah that summer (1980). 
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It appears that during the period the parties were 
separated, husband found himself a girlfriend, {Ellen Jensen) 
and the parties filed for divorce. In September, 1980, wife 
obtained an order for temporary support whereby husband was 
required to pay a total of $1240/month (including condo payments). 
Pending trial of the divorce action the condominium was sold, 
netting the parties $20,997e81, which was held in escrow. 
At trial {in August, 1981) it was established that 
husband's salary was $62,000 per year. He also usually received 
bonuses {$6,000 in 1979, $10,000 in 1980), although that depended 
on corporate profits. He has an expense account with the company 
and other benefits. Wife is not presently employed and has no 
special job skills. 
Husband claims expenses of $2,457/month while wife 
claims $1,922/month. There is evidence that during the pending 
divorce, husband lavished gifts upon Ellen Jensen, although he 
disputes it. The court found that husband had "dissipated assets 
for his own purposes and has generally made no attempt to preserve 
the marital assets for distribution." The court therefore awarded 
most of the assets to the wife as follows: 
{Please continue to next page.) 
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Husband 
cash . . . • 
Stock (Paradox) . . 
1981 Pontiac 
Mortgage 
Differential 
Insurance Rebate 
Note Receivable 
Furniture 
1/2 Kennecott 
Savings . . . . 
$ 295.64 
3,000.00 
9,325.44 
316.80 
163.40 
2,700.00 
2,250.00 
7,103.00 
Wife 
*Tax Refund. . . $ 658.55 
*Cash from Condo . 20,997.81 
*Stock (Asarco) . . 2,031.25 
19 77 Chrysler . 3,675.00 
Furniture . 7,500.00 
Paintings . 4,000.00 
*1/2 Kennecott 
Savings . . . . . . . 7,103.50 
Note: The items marked "*" are those which husband says should be 
awarded to him. 
The court o~dered that husband was to be liable for approxi-
mately $38,000 in debts, most of which were incurred separately 
by him. The court also awarded wife alimony in the amount of 
$1,800/month plus one-half of husband's vested retirement bene-
fits when husband reaches age 65 ($875/month). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS: 
1. Property 
Husband first says that most of the marital assets 
were acquired in Arizona (a community property state) and that 
an equal division is the only equitable division. He seeks all 
or most of the items marked * above, claiming that any other 
division constitutes an abuse of discretion, particularly when 
he is strapped with all of the debt. He concedes that the divi-
sion was·made because the court found that he had dissipated the 
assets, but claims that there is no basis in the evidence for 
such finding. 
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Wife points out that there was a large amount 
of cash under husband's control which was never accounted for. 
She does this by totalling his expenses, her expenses, and 
taxes and subtracts these total expenses from total income. 
She says the discrepancy in 1980 was $25,460 and in 1981 
$19,219. She alleges that either husband still has the money 
or he spent it for his own purposes. The trial judge obviously 
bought that argument when she found "he has had control of sub-
stantial funds which he has used at his discretion and has not 
sufficiently or convincingly accounted for said funds.'' Hus-
band concedes that he spent $2,000 on his girlfriend, but there 
is evidence that he spent much more. 
Both parties cite cases to establish what consti-
tutes an abuse of discretion in the division of marital property. 
Husband says there is obvious bias here and that in such a case 
the appellate court may interpose its own judgment. Jorgenson 
v. Jorgenson, Utah, 599 P.2d 510 (1979). Wife says that there 
is evidence to support what the trial court did and therefore 
this Court will be hard-pressed to upset the award. See English 
v. English, Utah, 565 P.2d 409 (1977) and Berry v. Berry, Utah 
635 P.2d 68 (19811. 
2. Alimony 
The parties seem to agree that alimony is to be 
based on the needs of the wife and the ability of the husband 
to pay. See English v. English, supra. Husband says that this 
standard was not employed, but rather the trial court is trying 
to punish him. Based on monthly take home pay of $2,679.44, 
-4-
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husband says he will get $1,779 and she will get $2,500 after 
adjustments are made for taxes and her potential employment . 
. He says that when matched against respective projected expenses! 
she will have a surplus and he a deficit. He wants the award 
reduced to $900. 
Wife points out that the trial court made specific 
findings as to the elements required in English for a support 
award. She says husband has manipulated the figures. She says 
that using $62,000/year as a basis, she will get $21,600 gross 
and he will get $40,400 gross. She also says that the award 
is based on the present circumstances arid that at present, she 
has no employment. 
3. Retirement Benefits 
One exhibit showed that if husband were to retire. 
in June 1980 he would be entitled to $1,592 per month, effective 
on his 65th birthday. If husband were to work 6 more years 
(until. he was 65), the monthly benefit would. be $2,608.00. The 
trial court extrapolated and held that as of the date of the 
decree, husband's vested retirement was $1,757.00 per month. 
The court ordered that when (and if) husband retires, wife is 
entitled to half of his vested retirement as of the date of the 
divorce, or about $875. 
Husband says that this is contrary to Bennett v. 
Bennett, Utah, 607 P.2d 841 (1980) in that the benefits had no 
present value. Wife seems to agree that Bennett might be subject 
to that interpretation and if so, Bennett should be overruled. 
She says that alternatively Bennett may be narrowly construed to 
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mean that an estimate of retirement benefit value may not be 
used in the division of other assets. (She cites here Englert 
v. Englert, Utah, 576 P.2d 1274 (1978) .} She contends that she 
has worked just as hard as husband for the retirement benefits 
and that it would be unfair to deny them to her. (Citing sev-
eral other jurisdictions.) She points out that she will get 
her share only "if and when" husband reaches the age of 65 and 
starts to draw retirement benefits. 
4e Attorney Fees 
Wife says that although she was required to pay 
her own fees below, she is entitled to them on appeal because 
she has been required to defend an "unmeritorious appeal.". 
See Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615 P.2d 1218 (1980). 
RECOMMENDATION: 
The Court will have to decide whether there has 
been an abuse of discretion in the alimony and property awards. 
As to the retirement benefits, other cases this Court has de-
cided may be of little help, because here they have been treated 
separate from other property. There is no merit for the claim 
for attorney fees. 
QUESTIONS: 
None. 
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